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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FAILURE TO
CONTROL THEIR CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
The mention of juvenile delinquency usually provokes indignant
remarks about parents. "If only they were more responsible or less per-
verse and exercised control over their children, we would have less
delinquency ... ."' This reflects the popular notion that parents are
responsible for the delinquency of their children.' The notion is applied
whether the parent overtly encourages misconduct or simply fails to
provide that "something" which would have produced a law-abiding
child. After a child commits a delinquent act, a logical step, according
to the notion, would be criminal prosecution of the parents under
"contributing to delinquency" statutes or related laws. Usually, when
parents are prosecuted, they have actively engaged in or encouraged the
child's misconduct. Sometimes, however, the laws are applied to parents
who have remained passive and allegedly have failed to prevent the
misconduct. A parent's liability for such an omission is the subject of
this note. Parental criminal liability for failure to control children will
be examined with the intent of recommending rational limits and
dispelling popular notions about the validity and effectiveness of punish-
ing parents.
In Madison Heights, Michigan, an ordinance declares that "[i]t
shall be unlawful for the parent of any minor to fail to exercise reasonable
parental control" if the child commits criminal acts as the result of that
failure.' If the minor commits two or more criminal acts within a twelve-
month period, the parent "may be deemed guilty" and may be punished
with a $500 fine, a 90-day jail sentence or probation.4 According to a
1. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 215 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT].
2. In a survey conducted in Chicago, nine of ten adults replied that parents should
be held responsible for the delinquency of their children. Kenny & Kenny, Shall We
Punish the Parents?, 47 A.B.A.J. 804 (1961). This article presents an overview of the
present topic with a discussion of the psychological problems involved in juvenile de-
linquency and parental inadequacy. See also Samore, Parental Delinquency, 8 CLEVE.-
MAR. L. REv. 568 (1959).
3. MADISON HEIGHTS, MICH., CODE § 8-221 (1970). Madison Heights is a suburb
of Detroit. Similar ordinances are in force or are under consideration in Detroit, St.
Louis and Washington, D.C.
4. Id. § 8-223.
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recent magazine article,5 parental reaction to the ordinance ranged
from optimism to apprehension. The threat of prosecution forced some
parents and their children to recognize their mutual responsibilities in
the family and community. Other parents overreacted and imposed
severe restrictions which further alienated their children. Despite varied
responses and some criticism, city officials credited the ordinance with a
significant reduction in youth crime.
Some authorities agree that making parents responsible for the
misconduct of their children will effect a reduction in delinquency.6
Others vehemently disagree:
Of the factors making for delinquency, parental inadequacy
is only one of many; others are the high cost of living, poor
standards of education, inadequate recreation, and slums, to
name only a few. But the only one of these at hand for punish-
ment is the parents.'
This conflict probably will never be reconciled; however, a discussion of
the rational limits of parental liability will be helpful. In this note,
liability for parental omissons will be examined in the context of con-
stitutional standards and the criminal law. The financial responsibility
of parents in tort law will be discussed for comparison. Attention will
be focused on the liability of a parent after his child has committed a
delinquent act. In addition, the concepts of strict liability and vicarious
liability will be discussed and shown to be applicable to torts but not
crimes of this sort. Throughout, the necessity for competent evidence
will be emphasized. Assumptions and presumptions that the parent
failed, neglected his duties or caused delinquency will be shown to be
invalid by present legal standards if based simply on the fact that the
child has committed one or more delinquent acts. Since the discussion
is more meaningful in context, non-legal information from the report of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administra-
tion of Justice, Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime,' will be used
5. Rodgers, When Children Break the Law, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, July, 1971, at 67.
In Lapeer, Michigan, a father was convicted of a misdemeanor and fined $50 under
a similar ordinance for failure to meet community standards of supervision and control.
The man's son and a companion had caused $1200 damage to windows with air guns.
The case is now on appeal. See A Father on Trial for What His Son Did, LIFE, Feb.
18, 1972, at 61.
6. J. Edgar Hoover has been quoted as saying that "[j]uvenile crime could be
abated if parents were made to face legal and financial responsibility for the criminal
acts of their children." NEWSWEEK, April 2, 1956, at 95.
7. S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCLY 25 (3d ed. 1970).
8. Hereinafter referred to as President's Commission Report.
1972]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/5
334 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
to place the issues in proper perspective.
PARENTAL ROLE IN DELINQUENCY
In the President's Commission Report, the family was deemed
"the first and most basic institution in our society for developing the
child's potential . . . . "' Thus, the importance of the intra-family
relationhip in delinquency control is apparent. However, contributing
causes of delinquency were also found outside the family. A few of these
additional factors were social class, educational level, urbanization, living
conditions and social instability.1" "Bewilderingly complex" cause-and-
effect relationships were revealed in studies of delinquency; however,
a general principle seemed to emerge that
whatever in the organization of the family, the contacts among
its members, or its relationships to the surrounding com-
munity diminishes the moral and emotional authority of the
family in the life of the young person also increases the likeli-
hood of delinquency.1
In many delinquency situations, certain factors were found to be com-
mon: lack of respect and esteem for an ineffective father; embarrass-
ment with low family status in the community; lack of affection; and
inconsistent mixtures of permissive and strict discipline.' Although
parents were at fault in some situations, social forces were believed to
have a more pervasive influence and to account for the magnitude of the
problem. "It is not parental perversity but parental poverty that is the
problem."' 8 Instead of punishment for parents, programs of job training,
family planning and improved housing were recommended. 4
Inadequate and irresponsible parents, no doubt, have a detrimental
influence on children; however, it is clear that they represent only part of
the problem. Other substantial causes can be operating at the same time,
and isolation of controlling factors can be difficult. Therefore, the blanket
statement that "parents are the cause of delinquency" is neither accurate
nor precise. These complexities must be considered in the evaluation or
application of statutes that authorize criminal prosecution of parents.
CRIMINAL STATUTES
Criminal prosecution of parents is authorized by a variety of state
9. PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssION REPORT 45.
10. Id. at 188-221.
11. Id. at 45.
12. Id. at 46.
13. Id. at 215.
14. Id. at 216.
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and local laws. City ordinances such as in Madison Heights, 5 school
attendance laws, curfew ordinances and state "contributing to delin-
quency" statutes are typical authorities. Under the curfew " or truancy'
laws, it is unlawful for a parent to permit or allow violations. Under the
Madison Heights type ordinance or the contributing statutes, it is
unlawful to "fail to control" a child or "omit a duty" owed to the child
if such failure or omission causes or tends to cause delinquency.'"
The neglect statute is another prevalent law dealing with delin-
quency and parents. The typical neglect statute imposes upon parents
affirmative duties to provide necessities and to refrain from abusing or
abandoning the child.'" When a court finds child neglect because the
parent has failed to perform his duties, the issue usually is custody of
the child and not punishment of the parent. Consequently, contributing
statutes are more pertinent to the present discussion.
The variety of laws available for punishing parents is revealed by
the Madison Heights ordinance and the following examples. Under the
New York contributing statute, a parent can be prosecuted if "he fails
or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control" of his child
to prevent him from becoming abused, neglected, delinquent, truant,
incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient."0 An Ohio statute
declares that a parent has the "power" to control his child and will be
punished if he has "failed or neglected to subject [the child] to reason-
able parental control and authority .... "2 The California contribut-
ing statute applies to "[e]very person who commits any act or omits
the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to
cause or encourage" a child to become delinquent or neglected.22 The
Madison Heights ordinance, in addition to proscribing certain conduct,
includes a provision, similar to a statutory presumption, that the parent
"may be deemed guilty" if the child commits more than one delinquent
15. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, - , 36 Ohio Op.
2d 345, - , 220 N.E.2d 126, 127 (Ct. App. 1966) ; 2 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS,
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES 422 (1963). See generally Note, Curfew Ordinances and the
Control of Noctural [sic] Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 66, 77 (1958).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-207 (1961).
18. Geis, Contributing to Delinquency, 8 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 59, 67-74 (1963) ; Lud-
wig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REv. 719 (1952).
19. In re Minor, 250 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Ex parte Hunter, 45 Cal. App. 505,
188 P. 63 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920) ; Nelson v. Clifton, 202 S.W2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) ; Sullivan, Child Neglect: The Environmental Aspects, 29 OHIo ST. UJ. 85
(1968).
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
21. OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.411 (Baldwin 1971).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1970).
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act in a twelve-month period."5 No similar provisions were found in a
brief survey of contributing statutes.24
Violation of the state contributing statutes is a misdemeanor punish-
able typically by imprisonment for not more than one year and by fine
of up to $1000.2" The Madison Heights ordinance provides a maximum
penalty of a $500 fine, a 90-day jail term and probation.2" In Ohio,
after a child is adjudged delinquent and placed on probation, the parent
must deposit a bond (up to $500) with the court for the duration of the
probation if the child's delinquency was attributable to the parent's
failure to control him. The bond may be forfeited, in full or in part,
following any subsequent finding that a violation of probation or a subse-
quent delinquent act by the child was due to the parent's failure to
control him.2 7
The broad language of contributing statutes reflects the purpose of
protecting the morals, physical health and well-being of minors.r'
Because of this broad purpose, defining prohibited adult conduct is
difficult. Since delinquency is a "vague and slippery concept,"29 the
difficulty is compounded. It is even further complicated because many
states do not require an adjudication of delinquency before the adult can
be prosecuted."0 These states prosecute if the adult conduct "tends to
cause" delinquency because "the preventive feature of this statute is
abolished if guilt can only be established after the child becomes delin-
quent .... "s' These definitional problems are usually encountered in
cases involving active adult conduct; however, the difficulties with pas-
sive conduct are comparable if not more troublesome conceptually.
Generally, "duty" and "reasonable parental control" are left undefined.
Courts attempt to justify the broad scope of contributing statutes
and the potential unfairness of the vague and imprecise language with
the policy of preventing delinquency and protecting children. 2 However,
23. MADISON HEIGHTS, MICH., CODE § 8-223 (1970).
24. The Minnesota contributing statute contained a similar presumption until a
1953 amendment. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.315 (1971).
25. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1970).
26. MADIsON HEIGHTS, MIcH., CODE § 8-223 (1970).
27. OH Io REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.411 (Baldwin 1971).
28. People v. Calkins, 48 Cal. App. 2d 33, 119 P.2d 142 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Slaughter v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957); People v.
Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398, 218 N.E.2d 288, 271 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1966).
29. PR SIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT 410.
30. State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
945 (1959) ; State v. Williams, 236 Ore. 18, 386 P.2d 461 (1963) ; Lovvorn v. State, 215
Tenn. 659, 389 S.W.2d 252 (1965) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 824 (1968).
31. Lovvorn v. State, 215 Tenn. 659, -, 389 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1965).
32. Note, Contributing to Delinquency Statutes-An Ounce of Prevention, 5 WIL-
LAMETrrE LJ. 104, 109 (1968) ; 15 VILL. L. REv. 767, 769-71 (1970).
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the statutes are the subject of strong criticism and demands for repeal.8"
Although the contributing statutes are upheld frequently, despite uncer-
tain wording," some have been declared unconstitutional because of
vague and overbroad language."
The contributing statutes and related laws represent only one aspect
of parental liability. Financial responsibility laws impose tort liability
on parents for damage caused by their children. It is instructive to
examine this civil liability for comparisons.
CIVL LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Recent financial responsibility statutes impose vicarious civil liability
on parents for the intentional torts of their children.88 Under the
common law, a child is liable for his torts although, usually, he is not
financially able to pay damages.8 7 The parent-child relationship has not
been considered a basis for vicarious civil liability; consequently, the
parent has had no legal responsibility for damage caused by the child. 8
Apart from the family relationship, the parent may be liable for the
child's intentional torts if he encouraged or ratified the act, if he allowed
the child access to a dangerous instrumentality, if he failed to control a
child with known dangerous propensities or if he was negligent himself.89
Because of these limitations, many victims cannot recover their losses.'"
The financial responsibility statutes were enacted supposedly to
give innocent victims a chance for compensation."' The statutes impose
vicarious liability on the parent for damage caused by his child regardless
33. S. RUBIN, supra note 7, at 30; Geis, supra note 18, at 79-81.
34. Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913
(1959) ; People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) ;
State v. Barone, 124 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1960) ; Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super.
603, 133 A.2d 276 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958) ; 15 VILL. L. Rav. 767 (1970).
35. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948) ; State v. Hodges, 254 Ore.
21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969), noted in 15 VILL. L. REV. 767 (1970) ; State v. Gallegos, 384
P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1963).
36. These statutes are analyzed and compared in numerous law review articles.
E.g., Comment, Liability of Negligent Parents for Torts of Minor Child, 19 ALA. L. Rv.
123 (1966) ; Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1037 (1970)
Note, The Pennsylvania Parental Liability Statute, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 578 (1968).
37. Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961) ; Glean v. Smith, 116
Ga. App. 111, 156 S.E.2d 507 (1967); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs 871-73
(4th ed. 1971) ; Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L. REv. 886, 888 (1934) ; Comment, Liability of Negligent Parents for Torts of Minor
Child, 19 ALA. L. REv. 123 (1966).
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 871 (4th ed. 1971).
39. Id. at 871-72.
40. Id. at 871.
41. Id.
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of the parent's fault or knowledge of the child's misdeeds. 2 Because of
this, the statutes have been criticized strongly.4" If the statute is properly
drafted, the cause of action against the parent is in addition to existing
remedies."' In most cases, the liability is limited by the statutes45 to a
maximum ranging typically between $10046 and $2000. 4 1 Because of this
relatively low limit, it has been suggested that the motive is not com-
pensation but prevention of delinquency by pressuring parents."' It has
been contended that the statutes will have a "wholesome regulatory
effect" on juvenile delinquency; 4 ' however, indications have been that
no significant reduction in delinquency will be realized."0
Until recently, the statutes had withstood constitutional attack be-
cause the parent-child relationship was considered to be a reasonable
basis for the exercise of state police power.5' In a recent Georgia case,
parental liability regardless of fault or knowledge was considered a
deprivation of property without due process of law."2 Since the Georgia
statute allowed unlimited recovery," it was distinguishable from the
several limited liability statutes that have been upheld. The Georgia court
considered such limited liability to be penal rather than compensatory.
Financial liability statutes go beyond what appears to be reasonable
for criminal prosecution."' They impose vicarious liability for the conduct
of the child and disregard parental fault. Strict and vicarious liability
might be acceptable in tort for the purpose of reparation and compensa-
tion for damages.55 However, liability without fault does not seem to be
acceptable for criminal prosecutions since the purpose is punishment, not
compensation.
42. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963);
Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
43. S. RuRi, supra note 7, at 29; Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55
IOWA L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1970).
44. Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IowA L. REV. 1037, 1044 (1970).
45. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 871 (4th ed. 1971).
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (Supp. 1970).
47. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Baldwin 1971).
48. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, - , 130 S.E.2d 645,
650 (1963) ; 36 WASH. L. REv. 327 (1961).
49. 55 MicH. L. REv. 1205, 1207 (1957).
50. Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. L.J. 254, 264 (1964).
51. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963);
Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967) ; Note, The Iowa Paren-
tal Responsibility Act, 55 IowA L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1970) ; Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 612
(1966).
52. Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1968).
54. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
55. Note, The Pennsylvania Parental Liability Statute, 29 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 578, 584
(1968).
338
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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR OMISSIONS
The contributing statutes and related laws impose criminal liability
on parents for conduct that causes or tends to cause delinquency." In
the usual case, parents are prosecuted for their own active conduct,
such as encouraging delinquent acts or committing sexual acts against
the child or in his presence. Such active conduct poses little conceptual
difficulty. However, attributing a child's delinquency to the passive
conduct of the parent requires analytical attention.
Liability for an omission is predicated on the existence of a duty to
act.57 Moreover, the accused must have the capacity, means and ability
to perform since there is no duty to do the impossible." The statutes, in
essence, impose an affirmative duty to prevent the delinquency of a child,
whether the prohibition is "failure to control" or "omission of duty."
Therefore, a parent is liable for his passive conduct if he failed to act
when he could and should have acted and his action would have prevented
the child's misconduct.
Criminal prosecution of parents is valid only within rational limits
that are consistent with the criminal and constitutional law. Those
rational limits are determined by reasonable definition of the parental
duty and satisfaction of the requirements of "true crime."
-A "true crime" is typified by commonly known felonies such as
robbery and burglary. The contributing offense is a misdemeanor;
however, misdemeanors of the type proposed herein are included within
the concept of "true crime."59 A "true crime" is defined as
a voluntary and intentional violation by commission or omis-
sion, by a legally competent person, of a legal duty that com-
mands or prohibits an act for the protection of society, punish-
able by judicial proceedings in the name of the state."0
The elements of a "true crime" are as follows: 1) an act (or omission);
2) mens rea or intent to commit the act (or omission); 3) concurrence
of act and intent; 4) causation; and 5) harm."
A "strict liability" offense differs from a "true crime" in the sense
56. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
57. R. PaERINS, CRIMINAL LAW 595 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
58. Id. at 601.
59. Id. at 12.
60. M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS 50 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as BASSIOUNI].
61. Id.; J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1960) [here-
inafter cited as HALL].
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that the mens rea requirement need not be satisfied.6" The defendant is
held liable whether he intended to commit a wrongful act or not. In
"vicarious liability," a person is held criminally liable for the wrongful
acts of another person. 3 Vicarious liability cannot be the basis of true
crime because the mens rea requirement for criminal responsibility of
one person cannot be satisfied by the state of mind of another person.
Criminal responsibility is a very personal thing. 4
The importance of true crime standards for parental liability will
be demonstrated in discussing omission of duty, parental attitude and
intent (mens rea), causation and proof. It will be argued that strict
liability and vicarious liability are inappropriate bases for parental
liability.
Omission of Duty
Criminal omissions are subject to the same liability as commissions,
although there is some conceptual difficulty in equating inaction with
action.65 "Nothing in the potentially harmful effects of failure to act
entitles omissions to more lenient treatment than commissions."66 The
duty requirement does not distinguish omissions from commissions be-
cause there is a corresponding duty to refrain from committing acts."T
However, reference to duty in omissions facilitates the definition of the
proscribed conduct since it is difficult to isolate inaction except in terms
of obligations left unfulfilled.
A legal duty is required for criminal liability, whereas a moral
duty is not considered sufficient.68 Legal duties are created by statute,
contract or legal relationships such as parent-child or master-servant.6"
For parents, the legal duty to control their children is created both by the
relationship and statutes. The legal duty requirement restricts liability
to persons likely to recognize and respond to the duty.7" A broader
concept, such as moral duty, would impose potential liability on persons
less likely to recognize the consequences of their inaction. For example,
62. PERKINS 806.
63. Id. at 813.
64. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 585, 155 A.2d 825, 830 (1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960).
65. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 424
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Frankel] ; Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 1043, 1047 & n.17 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Mueller].
66. Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 614 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Hughes].
67. HALL 193.
68. PERKINS 593; Frankel 390.
69. PERKINS 595.
70. Frankel 397.
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of those watching the beating or drowning of a child, only the father
(or a lifeguard) has a legal duty to act.7' Other onlookers have no legal
duty to act and are not criminally liable for the consequences of their
inaction, even though their inaction may be morally reprehensible.
The duty imposed on parents by the contributing statutes and related
laws is presented in broad language; however, it must be narrowly
defined in application. A definite legal duty is required.72 Fair notice
and reasonable standards of guilt are required by the Constitution;
consequently, criminal provisions are invalid if they are so vague and
indefinite that a man cannot know the consequences of his conduct.7 In
addition, a provision cannot be so broad that it includes within its
scope both innocent and culpable conduct.7"
The duty to prevent delinquency must be closely associated with the
misconduct of the child.75 A broader construction would be uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad because the parent would have no
idea what affirmative acts were sufficient to fulfill his obligation. Failing
to teach the difference between right and wrong may be reprehensible,
but it is not a criminal offense. However, if one fails to prevent a criminal
act when he has the opportunity, it is another matter. Here, the omission
is closely associated with the misconduct, and liability is reasonable.
Since any other interpretation would be too broad, "omission of duty"
and "failure to exercise reasonable control" must have the same meaning.
One is assumed to know the existence of a legal duty;6 however,
he is not liable for failure to act unless he is aware of the circumstances
that give rise to a duty to act.7 Innocent ignorance of the circumstances
is not criminal. A person "cannot be said in any manner to neglect or
refuse to perform a duty unless he has knowledge of the condition of
things which require performance at his hands."7 8 For example, a driver
is not liable for failing to render aid after an accident if he did not know
71. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1960) ; Comment, Crimi-
nally Enforceable Duty to Act, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (1961).
72. People v. De Leon, 35 Cal. App. 467, 170 P. 173 (Dist. Ct. App. 1918).
73. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939).
74. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Alves v. Justice Court,
148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
75. The test of criminal omission is whether a person has the means, ability
and capacity to act and whether in fact he is objectively aware that such duty
exists as law, and arose, and that his failure to act exhibits a voluntary mani-
festation.
BAssiouNi 57.
76. BAssIouNi 57; HALL 205.
77. BASSIOUNI 57; HALL 205; PERKINs 600.
7& Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 101, 93 S.W. 646, 648 (Ct. App. 1906)
(manslaughter-negligence).
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he had been in the accident."9 For parental liability under a curfew
ordinance,
the parent or guardian must actually know about the child
violating the curfew ordinance, or the circumstances must be
such that a reasonably responsible parent should have known
that the child was violating the curfew."
To incur liability for failure to protect a child from injury, the parent
must know of the danger to the child."
Ignorance of the facts giving rise to the duty does not excuse an
omission, however, if there is a duty to be informed. 82 An example is the
duty of a train gate keeper to close the gate to cars when a train is
coming. He has a duty to know when the train is coming, so his ignorance
is not an excuse if he fails to close the gate.8" Within reasonable limits,
parental knowledge of prior misconduct of the child could be a basis for
a duty to be informed of future conduct. However, the parent should be
expressly advised of the duty after the misconduct of the child. Ignorance
of this additional duty should be an excuse to liability. Also, the duty
must be limited to the same or very similar misconduct and restricted to
a short period of time such as two months. If the duty extended beyond
similar misconduct, the parent would not know what to guard against.
The time limit is necessary because it is unreasonable and probably
counterproductive to require a parent to "hover" over a child for an
extended period. Subsequent misconduct could occur immediately as an
expression of spite or later during a period of complacency. Knowledge of
prior misconduct is also a factor to be considered in criminal negligence
and will be discussed in the following section.
Causation
Omission of a duty is criminal "only when we are sure that the
event was causally connected with the inactivity." '84 The difficulty in
establishing a causal connection is not the existence of the connection
79. People v. Holford, 63 Cal. 2d 74, 403 P.2d 423, 45 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1965) ; State
v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957) ; State v. Glover, 270 N.C. 319, 154 S.E.2d
305 (1967) ; Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 497 (1969).
80. City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, - , 36 Ohio Op. 2d 345,
-, 220 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ct. App. 1966).
81. PERKINS 600.
82. State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 446, 52 So. 567, 572 (1910) (manslaughter-neglect
of railroad rules).
83. State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 A. 609 (1936).
84. Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REV. 615, 617 (1942).
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but the relevance of the expected action to the final outcome as revealed
in the following context:
The drowning is not set in relation to the inaction as such,
since the process of drowning is neither brought about nor
accelerated by the passive attitude of the bystander. We ask,
therefore, whether the drowning would have been prevented
if the expected action had taken place. When we answer this
question in the affirmative, we confirm the relevance of the
omission as a cause. 5
In other words, the accused does not initiate the events leading to the
harm, but he allows current forces to take a toll which he could prevent."8
The causal relation, however, does not require the omission and the
harm to be closely connected in time. For example, failure to correct a
hazardous condition is a blameworthy cause of a fire which occurs a
long time after the opportunity arose."7
Determining whether a child's misconduct has been caused by
parental failure to control him is closely related to defining the duty. The
parental omission is the cause of the misconduct only if performance of
the duty would have prevented the misconduct. The omission of duty,
therefore, must be closely associated with the misconduct.
The popular notion that parents cause delinquency is not applicable
for determining criminal causation because studies do not reveal a consis-
tent relationship between delinquency and inadequate parents. Many causal
factors, such as slum conditions, may be operating at the same time, and
isolation of the controlling factor can be difficult. Also, deficiencies in
the family relationship that can result in delinquency are frequently
vague.8 For instance, a strong relationship between delinquency and
parental affection has been documented. 9 However, punishing a parent
because he is not affectionate is difficult to contemplate.
Juvenile delinquency is too complex a problem for the public to
seek solace in simple solutions. "Delinquency is an integral feature of
American society, and is not likely to be eradicated by crash programs.'"
A community must not be lulled into thinking that delinquency can be
cured by arbitrarily shifting the burden to parents. Clearly, if performance
of a duty when the necessity arose would not have prevented a child's
85. Id. at 618.
86. HALL 196.
87. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) ; HALL 201.
88. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
89. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT 199.
90. Id. at 427.
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misconduct, the failure to perform the duty should not be deemed the
cause of that misconduct.
After proof that an omission of duty has caused a child's misconduct,
mens rea, the distinguishing feature between true crime and strict
liability, remains to be proved. The attitude of the parent is the key
factor in determining whether punishment is warranted.
Parental Attitude or State of Mind
Guilt for any true crime requires the concurrence of perpetrating
conduct and criminal intent or mens rea.9' The requirement of mens
rea is the distinguishing feature between true crime and strict liability.9"
In contributing cases, mens rea is usually required for conviction, thus
precluding strict liability.93 Although these cases generally involve acts
of commission, particularly sex-related offenses, there is no reason to
distinguish omissions and commissions on the basis of mens rea.9'
The criminal intent or general mens rea requirement of true crime
has been described as the "awareness of evil, the sense of doing some-
thing which one ought not . . . . " For crimes of omission, an
"adequate mens rea" has been described as an "attitude of self-centered
thoughtlessness and disregard for the rights of others despite the capacity
and opportunity to realize and respect these rights . . . . " The mens
rea requirement for an omission is satisfied by recklessness where the
consequences are foreseen but not desired and by intentional omission
where the consequences are known, desired or foreseen to a certainty.17
As the "adequate mens rea" definition and the reference to recklessness
suggest, criminal negligence satsfies the mens rea requirement.
Criminal negligence, like negligence in tort, is determined by com-
parison with a standard of conduct. 8 That standard is the exercise of
due care and caution as represented by the conduct of a reasonable man
under the circumstances.9 The civil or tort law requires conformity with
91. PERKINs 834.
92. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
93. State v. Cutshaw, 7 Ariz. App. 210, 437 P.2d 962 (Ct. App. 1968) ; Slaughter
v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d
848 (1970).
94. HALL 201 ; Mueller 1100.
95. Mueller 1060.
96. Id. at 1063.
97. Hughes 603.
98. PERKINS 754.
99. Id.
Negligence is any conduct, except conduct intentionally or wantonly disregardful
of an interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for
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this standard and awards damages for slight deviations from it. On the
other hand, the criminal law requires a very substantial deviation from
the standard for guilt. °10 Although the concept of criminal negligence
appears most frequently in manslaughter cases, it applies to other situa-
tions also.' For criminal negligence, a disregard of a danger to life or
limb or some other substantial harm is probably required. In the family
situation, if the parent knows that the child has committed serious acts
in the past or is likely to in the future, the parent probably would be
criminally negligent if he did nothing to prevent a recurrence.
Ignorance or mistake of fact is an excuse for most true crimes." 2
This essentially negatives the presence of mens rea. The excuse is allowed
if the mistake was honest and reasonable and if the conduct of the
accused would have been lawful and proper if the facts had been as he
reasonably supposed. For omissions, ignorance of the facts that give rise
to the duty to act is an excuse to liability although the person is presumed
to know of his legal duties.' Unless a person knows of the necessity
to act, he is not conscious of his wrongdoing.' If the ignorance of fact
is due to criminal negligence, however, the omitter is not excused.'
The attitude of the parent is the key factor in determining whether
liability is warranted. If he knows of the necessity to control his child, has
the opportunity to control him and fails or refuses to do so, his state of
mind satisfies the mens rea requirement, and he should be criminally
liable. If the parent shows disregard or lack of concern for the conduct of
his child, he may be criminally negligent and liable. If he has notice
of prior misconduct of the child, this is a factor to be considered in
determining reasonable conduct under the circumstances.
Strict Liability
Strict liability is applied in "public welfare offenses" such as
traffic violations and sale of adulterated food.'" These are government
regulations that would be difficult to enforce without small penalties in
the form of fines. The primary purpose of the penalties is to enforce the
regulations, not to punish blameworthy conduct. Some courts disregard
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.
PERINS 753 (footnote omitted).
100. HAL 204; PERKINS 757.
101. PERKINS 757.
102. Id. 939-41.
103. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
104. Frankel 394.
105. HALL 204; PERKINS 757.
106. HALL 347; PERKINS 801.
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mens rea entirely, while others impose a lesser standard of blameworthi-
ness than is present in true crime.1"' In either event, liability is imposed
without satisfying the mens rea requirement of true crime. Liability is
not so strict as to be absolute; however, in most cases, ignorance or
mistake of fact is not an excuse . 8 Because of the difference in purpose
and definition, strict liability should not be applied to true crimes0 9 and
should not be a basis for imprisonment.110
Strict liability is applied, in a limited way, to contributing offenses
in some jurisdictions."' Mens rea is not required in the sense that mistake
as to the age of a child is not an excuse. These mistake cases usually
involve liquor or sex-related offenses. Since age is a definitional require-
ment peculiar to delinquency, the decisions should not be applied to
prosecution of parents.
Under strict liability, the parent may be held liable without know-
ledge of the facts giving rise to the duty to control the child, since
ignorance or mistake of fact is not an excuse." 2 Undoubtedly, a con-
viction may be achieved more easily if the prosecution can avoid the
burden of proving mens rea or disproving a reasonable mistake. However,
the problems of proving a true crime seem to be an insufficient reason
to impose strict liability on parents for omissions that otherwise could
be innocent.
Under some curfew ordinances, parents apparently are held strictly
liable for a violation by the child."' Apparently, the purpose is to "enlist"
the support of parents in enforcing the curfew. In some communities
it is not a defense that the parent did not have knowledge that the child
was violating the ordinance. Other communities apply an objective test
of knowledge which is satisfied by a showing that the parent should
have known of the curfew violation. In either case, the requirements of
true crime are not met; therefore, punishment of the parent, even by
small fine, does not seem to be proper. In addition, it does not appear
to be likely that application of strict liability will have more of a deter-
rent or persuasive effect on parents than adherence to the traditional
standards of true crime.
107. PERKINS 806.
108. Id. 802.
109. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); HALL 336; PERKINS797.
110. PERKINs 794.
111. Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963) ; State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920,
95 So. 2d 499 (1957) ; Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 848 (1970).
112. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
113. Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Noctural [sic] Juvenile Crime,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, 77-78 (1958).
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The "public welfare offense" with strict liability has been criticized
as an inappropriate means for the enforcement of general regulations
for the safety, health and well-being of the community.11"' Holding
parents strictly liable for omissions seems to be even less appropriate.
Protection of the general public may justify strict liability for a
restaurant owner who inadvertently sells adulterated food, since the
business involves intimate contact with the public. There seems to be no
similar justification for regulation of families, by strict liability.
Vicarious Liability
Criminal liability for the conduct of another, vicarious liability, is
not consistent with the requirements of a "true crime." '115 Unlike true
crime, the conduct and state of mind of the accused are not controlling
considerations."' In effect, an innocent person is liable for the culpable
conduct of another.
Vicarious liability, like strict liability, is applied in the "public
welfare offenses." Usually, the accused is the employer of the wrongdoer
and is liable if the employee commits the act within the scope of employ-
ment.1 ' Punishment is limited to fines because imprisonment for the
conduct of another is a violation of the due process requirement of the
Constitution." 9
The temptation to discard prison sentences and impose vicarious
liability on parents is strong, but it should be overcome. Under the
contributing statutes, the purpose is to protect the child. This purpose
does not seem to be served by punishing parents for passive conduct that
is not criminal. If vicarious liability is imposed, the parent is likely to be
more alienated than deterred or spurred to control his child. In effect, the
parent is punished for being related to the delinquent child. The parent
should only be prosecuted by the standards of true crime under which
liability is based exclusively on personal causation.'
Proof and Presumptions
It is difficult to prove that the passive conduct of a parent was a
cause of a child's misconduct or that the parent knew of the necessity to
114. HALL 345.
115. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
116. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689,
723 (1930).
117. Mueller 1070.
118. PERxiNS 814.
119. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 848 (1960).
120. Id. at 585, 155 A.2d at 830.
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act. Consequently, there is a great temptation to presume causation and
knowledge after proof of the child's conduct.
Statutory presumptions are considered valid only if the proved fact
and the presumed fact are related by some rational connection.12' This
standard serves as a guide for legislative investigations into the validity
of presumptions in new laws. In a recent criminal case, the Supreme
Court demanded "substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend."' 2
A parent should be presumed to know that he has a legal duty to
control his child. However, he should not be presumed to know the facts
which give rise to the duty to act. 2 A statutory presumption of know-
ledge would involve the untenable conclusion that most parents know
what their children are doing at all times. Even if the parent has know-
ledge of a prior offense, he will not necessarily have forewarning of a
subsequent offense. To presume a causal relation between the child's
conduct and a parental omission is unsound because reported evidence
does not support the presumption with certainty.'24 Even if the parent
had knowledge of a prior offense, it is not reasonable to presume that he
could have prevented the subsequent misconduct, since the child is not
within the direct control of the parent at all times. Proof of the child's
conduct should be considered by the jury as circumstantial evidence
only, without presumptions.
The prosecution receives an unfair advantage from the added
weight of a state authorized permissive presumption.'25 Even though
the presumption can be rebutted, its existence obscures the tenuous
foundation on which it rests. The initial appeal and "apparent" validity
tend to discourage any thoughtful consideration of whether the presump-
tion is indeed true. The prosecution is allowed to avoid the difficult task
of connecting the child's misconduct to some aspect of the complex family
relationship. On rebuttal, the parent must face that same task. There
seems to be no apparent reason for simplifying the case for the pro-
secution.
The Madison Heights ordinance contains a provision that a parent
121. Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
122. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
123. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
125. The statutory presumption is permissive in that the jury is not required to
presume violation from the proved fact. Otherwise, the presumption would interfere
with the requirement that the jury find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Note, The Un-
constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REv. 341, 343 (1970).
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"may be deemed guilty" of failure to exercise reasonable parental control
if the child commits more than one criminal act in a twelve-month
period."' Another section provides for notice to the parent of his re-
sponsibility under the ordinance after his child has been arrested. 2 '
Together, these sections seem to create a presumption of knowledge and
causation. In the discussion above, such presumptions were shown to
be improper. Another construction of the provisions is that a special duty
is imposed on the parent to keep informed about the conduct of the
child.12 However, the duty is not confined to a short period or to conduct
which is similar to the initial offense. Even if so confined, the provisions
would seem to impose strict liability. With the special duty to have
knowledge, it is no excuse to plead ignorance of the circumstances that
give rise to the duty to control. However, omission of the special duty
should be treated as a true crime; consequently, the mens rea requirement
must be satisfied.
PROSPECTS OF REDUCED DELINQUENCY
If parental liability for omissions is limited as proposed, it is
doubtful that any significant reduction in total delinquency will be
realized. Prosecutions probably will deter similar omissions to the same
extent that deterrence is a factor in reducing the incidence of any crime.
However, because of evidentiary difficulties, there probably will be few
prosecutions or convictions. In effect, the proposed limitations will pre-
clude implementation of the popular notion that parents cause delin-
quency. Therefore, authorities will be free to pursue more constructive
solutions to delinquency.
If liability is extended beyond the proposed limits, prosecution may
have little constructive effect, and delinquency rates probably will not be
affected. Tension in the home may increase. Other family members,
particularly children, may be deprived of support because of the economic
strain of a fine or jail sentence on a parent. A child may use the statute
as a weapon against his parent. Public condemnation, though a motivat-
ing factor for most middle class parents, may be less effective in inner-
city areas where peer group pressure and status are less influential on
adults. Standards of reasonable control may vary with educational, social,
racial and ethnic background. Parents might be unwilling to seek help
with a delinquent child for fear of prosecution. Lack of enforcement
could foster disrespect for the law.
126. MADIsON HEIGHTS, MIcH., CODE § 8-223 (1970).
127. Id. § 8-222.
128. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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Experience in New York indicates that punishing parents does not
reduce delinquency.'29 Even the limited purpose of reducing truancy could
not be achieved. 8 ' An anti-vandalism law with parental liability was
opposed by judges because the strain on the parent-child relationship
made rehabilitation more difficult. 8 ' In a celebrated case, a mother was
prosecuted because she was indifferent and irresponsible, because she
failed to provide a home and encourage school attendance and because
her son shot at people in the street. 2 The public reaction was strong and
negative. Her conviction was reversed (for admission of hearsay), and
the police program to punish parents of delinquents was discontinued.
Prosecution of parents in Ohio over a ten-year period produced no
reduction in delinquency.' 3 The problems of proof and the subtleties of
causation were too great for punishment of parents to be effective in
reducing delinquency."" There was no evidence that punishment deterred
other parents from committing similar acts.' Where the parental conduct
consisted primarily of omissions, punishment as a method of control was
"so impracticable as to be worthless."' 8 However, punishing parents
did tend to satisfy "the blood-lust, the punitive-vindictive appetite of
self-righteous nondelinquent parents, irritated, aggravated public authori-
ties, and a substantial portion of the general public."'87
One writer casts aside punishment of parents as a solution to
delinquency in the following words: "Wherever the concept takes hold
that parents who fail should be punished, it should be exposed as a
delusion; wherever it has been put into practice, it should be banished as
quackery."' 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Many people subscribe to the notion that parents are responsible
for juvenile delinquency even though the parents do not overtly encourage
129. Gladstone, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Juvenile Delinquency in
New York State: A Developmental History, 21 BROOKLYN L. REv. 172, 182-86 (1955).
130. Id. at 182.
131. Id. at 186.
132. Human v. Rivera, 272 App. Div. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1947). See Gladstone,
The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Juvenile Delinquency in New York State: A De-
velopmental History, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 172 (1955) ; Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and
the Criminal Law, 5 VAND. L. REv. 719 (1952); 4 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 230 (1948-
1949) ; 30 ST. JOHN L. REv. 317 (1956).
133. Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents?, 12 FED. PROB. 23 (1948)
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id.
137. Id.
13& Rubin, Should Parents Be Held for Juvenile Delinquency?, 34 Fo-
cus, March, 1955, at 35, 38.
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misconduct by their children. Since a "good family life" is obviously
advantageous to a child's development, it is reasoned that the parent must
have failed to do "that something" which would have avoided the
problem. Consequently, punishment is advocated for those parents whose
children become delinquent.
Researchers confirm that inadequate parents are a cause of de-
linquency; however, they report that many other causes of equal import
can be operating at the same time. Obviously, then, a summary con-
demnation of parents with delinquent children is ill-founded. Since delin-
quency cannot be traced with consistency to inadequate parents, this
popular notion of causation is not a fitting basis for criminal liability.
Moreover, since studies show that it is difficult to isolate "that some-
thing" that the parent could have done to avoid the problem, he should
not be punished for not doing it. It is only when the action of a parent
could have prevented the child's misconduct that his inaction should
be deemed the cause. This situation arises when a parent has the oppor-
tunity to control the child and fails to do so.
An affirmative duty to control their children is imposed on parents
by a variety of state and local laws. Failure to perform the duty subjects
the parent to criminal prosecution. Under these laws, a parent can be
liable for his own omission, but he cannot be liable vicariously for the
conduct of his child. Such vicarious liability is unconstitutional. For his
own inaction, the parent should be liable in only three situations: 1) he
knew that the child was going to commit the act, had the ability to stop
it and failed to do so; 2) he did not know of the conduct of his child
but had a special, limited duty to be informed and failed to comply; or
3) he was so indifferent to the conduct of his child that he was criminally
negligent. In these situations, the parent should only be convicted after
proof that he was aware of his own wrongdoing or was indifferent to
the consequences of his inaction. Unless the parent had this attitude,
conviction is not warranted. A conviction without proof of the parent's
state of mind (mens rea) would be an imposition of strict liability which
is not appropriate for true crimes. In addition to limiting the liability as
described, presumptions which simplify the proof against the parent
should not be allowed.
The criminal liability of a parent must be limited as described
above to comply with constitutional and criminal law. Beyond such
legal considerations, the limitations are necessary if prosecuting parents
is to have any constructive influence on delinquency control. A parent
who is imprisoned or fined on the basis of strict or vicarious liability is
likely to be more alienated than deterred or reformed. The parent who is
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convicted because the prosecutor, judge and jury had some vague notion
that he caused the delinquency of his child is not likely to know what
reforms are necessary. Punishment places a burden on the parent and the
remaining members of a family already plagued with a rebellious child
and possibly a variety of other social problems. Within the proposed
limits of liability, punishment is imposed where it is warranted and where
it is most likely to effect a reduction in delinquency.
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